



When the administrator of a pension or employee benefit plan denies
a participant's claim for a benefit under the plan, and the dissatisfied
participant sues to recover the benefit, what standard of review
should the court apply in evaluating the reasonableness of the admin-
istrator's decision? Should the court adopt a deferential standard of
review, presuming the correctness of the administrator's decision
and requiring the participant to bear the burden of showing that the
decision was unreasonable? Or should the court apply a de novo
standard of review, considering the merits of the benefit denial with-
out any presumption in favor of the plan's internal decisionmaking?
Because ERISA, the 1974 regulatory scheme, 1 federalizes the field
of pension and employee benefitplans, the question of the appropriate
standard of review of benefit denials is one of federal law. Because,
however, the statutory text fails to speak to the standard of review, the
federal courts have had to deal with the question as a matter of deci-
sional law. By the late 1980s, deferential review under the so-called
arbitrary-and-capricious standard was the norm among the courts of
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appeal, 2 although some significant exceptions were being carved from
that standard, especially in the Third Circuit. In Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Brucb, 3 the Supreme Court astonished the ERI SA bar by
overturning the arbitrary-and-capricious standard and instituting de
novo review.
The issue in Brucb is one of considerable practical importance, on
account of the extent of ERISA's turf. Although ERISA is often
called the "pension reform law," the statute governs employee benefit
plans of all sorts. Among the nonpension plans (called "welfare bene-
fit plans") that ERISA regulates are those that provide most of the
nation's health care, as well as plans that provide for severance pay,
childcare services, accident and life insurance, tuition and educa-
tional assistance, and a variety of other fringe benefits. Health plans
alone make millions of benefit determinations every month. For-
tunately, most of these decisions flow automatically from unam-
biguous plan terms, but doubts inevitably arise at the margin. For
example: How much vision impairment must a worker suffer in
order to qualify as blind under a disability plan?4 Or, does a novel
medical procedure fall within the definition of covered benefits
under a health plan?5 Because the number of plans and of benefit de-
terminations is so enormous, benefit denial cases have come to con-
stitute the largest category of ERISA litigation.
There are solid justifications for insisting on more searching re-
view of plan decisionmaking than was occurring in pre-Brucb prac-
tice. However, the Supreme Court in Brucb dealt with the problem
so awkwardly that plan drafters have been able to evade the Court's
decision. There is reason to think that the very dissatisfaction that
brought the issue in Brucb to the Supreme Court in the first place will
recur, and that the Court will have to face the question anew. Under-
standing why the Brucb decision miscarried is, therefore, a matter of
consequence for the future of pension law. Furthermore, because the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brucb rests on an elementary error in
applying long-settled principles of trust law, it is important from
the standpoint of trust law to make clear why the Court's position is
2Firestone's Brief in the Supreme Court collects authority from the circuits, at 8, note S. See
also Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule under Siege, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 133,
139-43 (1989).
3109 S.Ct. 948 (1989).
4Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1985).
5E.g., Egbert v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990) (in vitro
fertilization procedure held covered).
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insupportable. The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of federal stat-
utory law under ERISA, but not of the common law of trusts that the
Court purported to apply in Brucb. Trust law is predominantly a
state-law field. The Court can impose a nonsense reading of ERISA
by fiat, but it cannot force state courts to repeat the error in ordinary
trust law settings.
I. PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUSTS
A. WHY PLANS ARE TRUSTS
ERISA requires that pension and employee benefit plans take the
trust form. 6 The idea of mandating that plan assets be trusteed was
not novel to ERISA. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 requires that a
union-sponsored multiemployer plan take the form of a trust with
equal numbers of employer-designated and union-designated trus-
tees. 7 Since 1921 the Internal Revenue Code has insisted upon the
use of the trust for pension plans as a precondition for what we now
call "qualifying" the plan for tax benefits. 8 Back into the last century,
at the dawn of the private pension system, employers set up pension
plans in the trust form.9
1. Segregation of assets. There are two main reasons why our legal
system has found it convenient to structure plans in the trust form.
The trust is a characteristic device for situations in which there is
some reason to have a separate entity or conduit. Pension plans have
such a need: achieving the deferral of wages. Instead of paying wages
directly to the employee, the employer contributes to a segregated
fund in which assets accumulate for future payment of benefits. This
segregation of the fund is the attribute that made the pension trust
attractive for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. 10
6
Unless plan assets take the form of insurance contracts, ERISA §403 requires that "all as-
sets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust .... ERISA §403(a).
7Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §302(c)(5), 29 USC §186(c)(5).
8See discussion in Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclu-
sive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1108, and text at note 14.
9E.g., MeNevin v. Solvay Process Co, 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1898), aff'd per
curiam 167 N.Y. 530, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901).
lOrdinarily, the employer would not receive a deduction for wages paid until the employee
receives the payment and is subject to taxes on it. Pension plans are exceptions. The employer
gets the deduction currently although the employee receives the benefit in later years. As a
general matter (depreciation apart), the Internal Revenue Code is reluctant to allow deductions
for mere bookkeeping entries. By requiring that the employer make pension payments into a
separate trust, the Code assures that the employer does not get a deduction until the pension
HeinOnline -- 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 209 1990
210 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
2. Trust fiduciary law. The other great advantage of trust law is that
it imports a set of well-developed fiduciary standards and ancillary
remedial rules. The great rubrics of substantive trust law are the
duty of prudent management and the duty of loyalty. 1 ' The trustee is
required to invest trust assets and to conduct trust functions in accor-
dance with objectively reasonable standards (prudence). And the
trustee is required to deal with trust property for the sole interest of
the trust beneficiaries, thus not for the trustee's own gain (loyalty).
The Taft-Hartley Act imposed the trust form on multiemployer
plans in 1947 in order to prevent John L. Lewis and other labor
leaders from using plan assets for union organizing or for self-
enrichment. 12 ERISA was enacted in 1974 in the wake of more than a
decade of Congressional investigation into looting and other abuses
of plans by some union leaders, and ERISA fiduciary law was meant
to be the cure. The drafters of ERISA determined to "apply rules
and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern
the conduct of fiduciaries."' 3 ERISA insists that persons exercising
discretion over plan assets 14 be subject to fiduciary standards that are
derived from trust law and that are spelled out in the statute. Lest
plan drafters be tempted to use the plan documents to squelch the
safeguards of ERISA fiduciary law, the statute contains an anti-opt-
out measure, section 404(a)(1)(D), requiring that plan documents be
"consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]."15
3. The exclusive benefit rule. The centerpiece of ERISA fiduciary
law, commonly called the exclusive benefit rule, is ERISA's version
of the trust-law duty of loyalty. An ERISA fiduciary "shall discharge
his duties with respect to the plan solely in the interest of the bene-
ficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries."'16
contribution is segregated from the corporate accounts. Segregation into a trust account also
has the effect of putting the pension fund beyond the reach of a troubled employer's general
creditors.
, I IRestatement of Trusts (2d) §§ 170 (loyalty), 174 (prudent administration) (1959); Restate-
ment of Trusts (3d) §227 (prudent investing) (1990).
12See Comment, 23 Duquesne L. Rev. 1033 (1985).
13Conference Report on HR 2, Pension Reform, HR Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 295, reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4277, 4562 (1976).
14On the definition of"fiduciary" in ERISA § 3(2 1), see Langbein & Wolk, Pension and Em-
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The drafters of ERISA adapted the exclusive benefit rule from the
trust-law duty of loyalty in order to prevent knaves from looting plan
funds. The protective purpose that led Congress to impose a federal
fiduciary regime to prevent and to remedy abuse of pension plan as-
sets applies equally to nonpension plans. A dollar is a dollar. It does
not much matter whether Jimmy Hoffa wants to steal from your
pension plan or your health plan. Thus, ERISA fiduciary law ap-
plies both to pension plans and to nonpension (welfare benefit) plans,
even though ERISA exempts welfare benefit plans from various
pension-specific parts of ERISA. 17
B. THE MISMATCH OF PRIVATE TRUST AND ERISA TRUST
18
Alas, there are important differences between the private trust and
the pension trust, and ERISA is sometimes insensitive to these dif-
ferences. That is the problem that underlies the litigation in Bruch.
The conventional private trust-created, for example, in my will for
the support of my widow and children-is a donative transfer. The
distinctive logic of a donative transfer is that the benefits are not re-
ciprocal. Unlike a business deal, a gratuitous transfer benefits only
the donees. Pension and employee benefit plans, by contrast, arise
from contract rather than gratuity. Although the pension and em-
ployee benefit system is said to be voluntary, in the sense that regula-
tory law does not require employers to offer such plans, when an
employer does offer a plan, the plan is not a gratuity. Fringe benefits
substitute for cash wages. Employers are not donors. Employers of-
fer plans for reasons of economic advantage, in the competition to
attract and retain employees. Thus, the employer has continuing
economic interests in the plans that it sponsors. 19
The most important of the employer's continuing interests is the
employer's liability for plan expenses. A welfare benefit plan pays its
17 1n particular, from the vesting and funding rules and the pension plan termination insur-
ance system.
18This section follows Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing under ERISA, in
Proxy Voting of Pension Plan Equity Securities 128 (Pension Research Council, Wharton
School) (McGill ed. 1989); and Fischel & Langbein, note 8 supra.
19 Employers incur administrative and regulatory costs in delivering wages in the form of
fringe benefits. Employees have various reasons for preferring some fringes over the equivalent
in cash wages. Many fringes are tax advantaged, and some (such as group insurance) embody
cost reductions that result from economies of scale. A further attraction of pension and em-
ployee benefit plans for employers is that such plans facilitate the departure of superannuated
employees; they constitute a part of the employer's program of personnel management. For a
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expenses on a current basis. In the typical case-for example, my
employer's health care plan-my employer is directly responsible
for the portion of my health care costs that the plan covers. If I am
healthy this year, the savings flow through to the employer. If I am
sick, the plan's costs for my health care are expensed to my employer
(subject to whatever steps the employer has taken to lay off some of
that risk in the insurance markets). Those expenses pass through di-
rectly to my employer's income statements as diminutions of net in-
come. As regards pension plans, under the most characteristic type
of pension plan, the defined benefit plan, the employer usually bears
a similar exposure to plan costs.
20
Because the settlor of a private trust does not have a continuing
economic interest in the trust fund that he has already given away,21
trust fiduciary law quite sensibly imposes a duty of loyalty that di-
rects all the economic benefits of the trust to the trust beneficiaries.
By contrast, the defined benefit pension plan or a welfare benefit
plan such as a health care or severance pay plan manifests a complex
contract in which both employer and employee have important inter-
ests. In subjecting these plans to a comparable duty of loyalty-that
is, to the exclusive benefit rule-ERISA transposes from the realm
of the unilateral donative transfer a regime that in some respects does
not fit the characteristics of pension and benefit law. The employer
has important economic interests in the operation of its plans, unlike
the settlor of a private trust. In truth, ERISA plans are not for the
exclusive benefit of the employees; they are for the joint benefit of
employer and employees. 22 The exclusive benefit rule works well in
preventing thugs from looting plans, but in other settings it mis-
describes the economic reality of ERISA plans.
more detailed discussion, see Why Are Pension Plans Employment-Based? in Langbein &
Wolk, note 14 supra, at 27-31.
20Under a defined benefit plan, the employer promises to pay a future benefit, commonly
expressed in a formula as a fraction of final average salary. Even though the employer has been
funding the plan by means of regular contributions, if the fund turns out to be inadequate to
pay the accrued benefits, the employer is liable to make up the shortfall. Thus, the employer
who sponsors a defined benefit plan bears the plan's investment risk. The healthier the invest-
ment returns that the plan experiences, the less that the employer will have to contribute to
honor the plan's pension promises.
2 1RestatementofTrusts(2d) §200 provides: "No one excepta beneficiary... can maintain
a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust .... Comment b declares that this principle
precludes the settlor from enforcing the trust, unless the settlor acts in another capacity under
the trust, such as the beneficiary of a retained interest.
22A main theme of Fischel & Langbein, note 8 supra, at 1118-19.
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C. THE NONNEUTRAL FIDUCIARY
Perhaps the feature of ERISA architecture that most clearly man-
ifests the tension within ERISA's transposed norms of private trust
law is ERISA's authorization of the nonneutral fiduciary. This is the
creature who holds center stage in Bruch. ERISA section 408(c)(3)
authorizes the employer or other plan sponsor to have its own "of-
ficer, employee, agent, or other representative" serve as the trustee
or in other fiduciary capacities for the plan. Employers routinely
exercise this authority, using management personnel to conduct both
investment activities (for funded plans) and benefit determinations.
ERISA's authorization of nonneutral fiduciaries is difficult to recon-
cile with ERISA's exclusive benefit rule. As the lower court observed
in Donovan v. Bierwirtb, the most celebrated ERISA fiduciary case,
"section 408(c)(3) expressly contemplates fiduciaries with dual loy-
alties," and this arrangement is "an unorthodox departure from the
common law rule against dual loyalties ....
ERISA's authorization of nonneutral fiduciaries represents an
unmistakable concession to the employer's interest in pension and
benefit plans. Congress could have adopted the opposite rule, requir-
ing outside persons to serve as plan fiduciaries, but the price would
almost certainly have been lower benefit levels and lower levels of
plan formation. We have seen that welfare benefit plan expenses
come more or less directly off the employer's bottom line, and that
the investment experience of defined benefit plans has a comparable
bearing on the employer's profit account. Employers view the invest-
ment of plan assets and the control of plan expenses as important cen-
ters of cost containment, hence as an integral management function.
ERISA Section 408(c)(3) necessarily embodies the acceptance of that
view, but ERISA neglects to reconcile the resulting conflict between
the nonneutral fiduciary and the exclusive benefit rule.
24
II. BRUCH IN THE TmIRD CIRCUIT
The Bruch case arose out of one of those corporate "down-
sizings" or "deconglomeritizations" that so typified the 1980s.
23538 F. Supp. 463,468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 680 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1982).
24See the discussion in Fischel & Langbein, note 8 supra.
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Firestone, the tire company, sold off its plastics division, comprising
five plants, to Occidental Petroleum. Occidental took over most of
the Firestone employees, who, as Firestone employees, had been
covered under Firestone's severance pay plan. It provided: "If your
service is discontinued, ... you will be given termination pay
[calculated on a length-of-service formula, if you are] released be-
cause of a reduction in work force .... 25
Some of the employees whose employment with Firestone termi-
nated when they were transferred to Occidental contended that they
were within the terms of the plan and entitled to receive severance pay,
even though they had employment continuity with Occidental. The
plan fiduciaries, who were Firestone managers, denied the claimed
benefits "on the ground that the sale of the Plastics Division to Occi-
dental did not constitute a 'reduction in work force' within the mean-
ing of the termination pay plan." 26 The employees sued in respect of
the benefit denial. The district court held for Firestone, unremarka-
bly applying the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review.
The Third Circuit reversed. In a learned and thoughtful opinion,
Judge Becker held that de novo as opposed to deferential review
should pertain. He reasoned that "under ERISA courts must be cog-
nizant of the features that distinguish the ERISA arrangements from
the paradigmatic common law situation. 27 Under Firestone's sever-
ance pay plan, "every dollar saved by the administrator on behalf of his
employer is a dollar in Firestone's pocket. "28Judge Becker pointed out
that trust law has long applied a standard of searching review in situa-
tions in which the trustee "is thought to have acted in his own interest
and contrary to the interest of the beneficiaries .... "29 In this case
Firestone "is clearly not disinterested in the amount of severance pay
awarded; its impartiality therefore cannot be relied upon to produce a
fair result."30
The Third Circuit's departure from deferential arbitrary-and-
capricious review had been anticipated in a few earlier cases, in which
25109 S.Ct. at 951.
261bid.





30828 F.2d at 145.
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intense conflicts of interest on the part of the plan fiduciaries had led
the reviewing courts to scrutinize the benefit denials more carefully. 
31
On the eve of the Bruch case, Judge Posner attempted to sum up the
authorities by remarking that "the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
may be a range, not a point. There may be in effect a sliding scale of
judicial review of trustees' decisions-more penetrating the greater is
the suspicion of partiality .... ,32
In pre-Bruch case law some courts had undertaken to justify defer-
ential review on the ground that the court should respect the special
expertise of the plan fiduciaries. The arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard "exists to ensure that administrative responsibility rests with
those whose experience is daily and continuous, not with judges
whose exposure is episodic and occasional," Judge Wilkinson wrote
in a prominent Fourth Circuit case. 33
Judge Becker in Bruch considered and rejected Judge Wilkinson's
view. A benefit denial case does not ordinarily "turn on information
or experience which expertise as a claims administrator is likely to
produce." Rather, Judge Becker reasoned, the case "is likely to turn
on a question of law or of contract interpretation. Courts have no rea-
son to defer to private parties to obtain answers to these kinds of
questions."'34 Judge Becker contrasted fiduciary investment func-
tions; the court should defer to a plan fiduciary's "decision about how
to invest plan funds," absent evidence of abuse. 35
Embodied in this line of reasoning are two rather different argu-
ments, a law/fact distinction and a challenge to the notion that plan
administrators possess expertise. Pure construction of the words of
an instrument may be likened to the "law" side of the law/fact line,
hence for the court, but it is an old truism that issues of law fade into
issues of fact. Judge Becker thought that the issue in Bruch did not
require him to "deal with a determination of fact by a plan admin-
istrator," and he was prepared "to leave for another day the definition
of the context, if any, in which courts should defer to such deter-
minations."13
6
31The case law is reviewed in Fischel & Langbein, note 8 supra, at 1133-35.
32Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987).
3"Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985).
34828 F.2d at 144.
151d. at n. 9.
361bid.
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The situation in Bruch may not have involved the plan in making
close determinations of fact, but in most benefit denial settings, con-
struction entails application. The further suggestion that plan ad-
ministrators do not bring real expertise to their work is problematic.
Employee benefits professionals commonly argue, for example, that
(especially in small and medium size firms) because they know their
workforce, they have a better feel than would a reviewing court for a
question such as whether a worker was malingering or hurting.
Actually, Judge Becker did not wholly deny that the administrator
may possess expertise. Rather, his main emphasis was on the propo-
sition that the imbedded conflict of interest that inclines a servient
administrator to decide in favor of his employer outweighs whatever
expertise the administrator may bring to the table. The "significant
danger that the plan administrator will not be impartial ... offsets
any remaining benefit which the administrator's expertise might be
thought to produce."
3 7
Despite the intuitive appeal of Judge Becker's conflict-sensitive
position, there is, at least in some cases, a respectable counterargu-
ment. Most plan decisionmaking occurs in the setting of long term or
repeat player relations. Employer-dominated fiduciaries have strong
incentives not to acquire a reputation for sharp practice in handling
benefit claims, a reputation that would harm employee morale and
cause employees to devalue plan benefits. Employer-dominated
fiduciaries are common in plan administration, even in single-
employer plans that have been collectively bargained. This seems to
bespeak the sense that-ordinarily-employees do not have much to
fear from putting their heads in this particular lion's mouth. Employ-
ees (even when unionized) may have recognized that they are better off
leaving substantial discretion over benefit denials to the employer,
because the employer is more likely to offer plans, and to enrich the
benefits, if the employer is left in control of the cost containment deci-
sions at the plan margins.
On the other hand, there are many circumstances in which the
employer's incentives for fairness grow attenuated, and the facts in
Bruch exemplify such a case. The employer's reputational interest is
not likely to be effective when the long term relationship between the
firm and the workers is dissolving, as in a plant closing or in a corpo-
rate restructuring such as Firestone's transfer of the workers in
Bruch.
37828 F.2d at 144.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Supreme Court in Brucb
sustained the Third Circuit's result, but substituted quite a different
rationale. Recall that the issue in Brucb is whether the reviewing
court should presume the correctness of the plan's internal decision-
making when an employer-dominated fiduciary renders a decision
that benefits the employer.
Judge Becker was self-consciously following trust-law tradition in
scrutinizing fiduciary conduct more closely when conflict of interest
is suspected. 38 The Supreme Court, however, expressly declined to
"rest our decision on the concern for impartiality that guided the
Court of Appeals," hence refused to pay attention to "whether the
administrator or fiduciary is acting under a possible or actual conflict
of interest."3 9 Thus, the Supreme Court decided to require de novo
review not on account of the factors that persuaded the Third Circuit
to impose de novo review, but even in circumstances in which those
factors were absent.
A. DOES TRUST LAW DEFER TO TRUSTEE DECISIONMAKING?
Despite its refusal to follow the Third Circuit in basing the re-
quirement of searching review on the conventional trust-law stan-
dard of heightened scrutiny for fiduciary conflicts of interest, the
Supreme Court purported to derive its requirement of de novo re-
view from trust law. "In determining the appropriate standard of re-
view for actions under [the ERISA section allowing plan participants
to sue in respect of benefit denials], we are guided by principles of
trust law. "40 The Court compacted its discussion of what it deemed
to be the relevant trust law into the passage reproduced here:41
38Judge Becker's opinion, 828 F.2d at 141, reproduces Commentg to Restatement of Trusts
§ 187: "The court will control the trustee in the exercise of a power where he acts from an im-
proper even though not dishonest motive .... In the determination of the question of
whether the trustee in the exercise of power is acting from an improper motive the fact that the
trustee has an interest conflicting with that of the beneficiary is to be considered." See also 828
F.2d at 145 ("The principles of trust law instruct that when a trustee is thought to have acted in
his own interest and contrary to the interest of the beneficiaries, his decisions are to be scru-
tinized with the greatest possible care").
39109 S.Ct. at 956.
4Id. at 954.
4'Ibid. The "omitted citations" are references to the standard treatises on trust law, Bogert
and Scott.
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Trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropri-
ate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959) ('[w]here discretion is
conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power,
its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent
an abuse by the trustee of his discretion'). [Citation omitted.] A
trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful
terms, and in such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will
not be disturbed if reasonable. [Citation omitted.] Whether 'the
exercise of a power is permissive or mandatory depends upon the
terms of the trust.' [Citation omitted.] Hence, over a century ago
we remarked that '[w]hen trustees are in existence, and capable of
acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the
exercise of a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they
act.' Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875) (emphasis
added)." . . . Firestone can seek no shelter in these principles of
trust law, however, for there is no evidence that under Firestone's
termination pay plan the administrator has the power to construe
uncertain terms or that eligibility determinations are to be given
deference.
It takes very little probing to see why this passage abuses the prin-
ciples of trust law that it purports to apply. The Court begins by in-
voking the authority of section 187 of the Restatement of Trusts,
which calls for the very deference to trustee decisionmaking that the
Court is about to deny in Bruch. The trustee's discretion, the Restate-
ment says, is "not subject to control by the court, except to prevent
an abuse by the trustee of his discretion." This abuse-of-discretion
standard is simply the arbitrary-and-capricious standard by another
name. And indeed, the Court says in introducing section 187 that
"It]rust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate
when a trustee exercises discretionary powers."
How, then, did the Court manage both to invoke section 187 and
to refuse that deference to fiduciary decisionmaking that section 187
requires? The leap occurs toward the end of the quoted passage. The
Court recalls its century-old trust-law precedent, Nichols v. Eaton,
and underscores a phrase from that opinion-a phrase endorsing ju-
dicial deference to trustees' "exercise of a discretion vested in them by the
instrument under which they act." The Court then draws a negative in-
fe- .e from the underscored words. "Firestone can seek no shelter
i. cnese principles of trust law, however, for there is no evidence that
under Firestone's termination pay plan the administrator has the
power to construe uncertain terms or that eligibility determinations
are to be given deference." Thus, the Supreme Court reasons that, as
[1990
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a matter of trust law, deference to the trustee's decisionmaking is
appropriate only when the trust power in question is particularly
granted by the trust instrument.
This distinction between trust powers that derive from the back-
ground law of trusts, and those that derive from the trust instrument,
is fundamentally mistaken. It is refuted in the very source that the
Court treats as authoritative, section 187 of the Restatement of Trusts.
Official Comment a to section 187 says: "When powers are discre-
tionary. The exercise of a power is discretionary except to the extent
to which its exercise is required by the terms of the trust or by the
principles of law applicable to the duties of trustees." In other words,
discretion does not depend upon an explicit grant in the instrument.
The trustee has discretion unless the instrument or some particular
doctrine of trust law denies discretion. Discretion is the norm.42 What
the Supreme Court in Bruch calls "the trust law de novo standard of
review"43 is simply nonexistent in trust law.
B. EXALTING FORTUITY
The Supreme Court's distinction between the law of the instru-
ment and the background law of trusts would frequently lead to bi-
zarre results. For example, legislation such as the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act'4 or a local equivalent is in force in most American juris-
dictions. These acts grant to trustees of private trusts extensive
powers to manage and to invest trust assets. Under the reasoning in
Bruch, if a trust instrument happens to incorporate these powers by
terms, the reviewing court should defer to the trustee's decision-
making. When, however, the trust instrument is silent on the matter
because the drafter has chosen to rely upon the statutebook that au-
thorizes the same powers rather than copy them into the instrument,
the rule in Bruch would deny judicial deference to the decision-
making of the trustees of that trust. Accordingly, the distinction
4'SO fundamental is this point that the Seventh Circuit has lately reiterated it even while
obeying the Supreme Court's commands in Bruc: "Under the common law courts will not
review the discretionary decisions of trustees and other fiduciaries de novo, but will look only
for the trustee's abuse of its discretionary authority." Exbom v. Central States Welfare Fund,
900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990) (EschbachJ., citing Restatement (2d) of Trusts §187).
43109 S.Ct. at 948.
447B Uniform Laws Annotated 741 (1985)
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between the background law of trusts and the law of the trust instru-
ment exalts a pure fortuity.
If I had to hazard a guess about why the Court took this distinc-
tion, my answer would be that a peculiarity of the facts inBrucb made
the distinction useful for deciding the particular case, and that not
much thought was given to the shortsightedness of letting freak facts
resolve the ERISA standard-of-review issue. The peculiarity in
Bruch is that "[a]t the time of the sale of its Plastics Division, Fire-
stone was not aware that the termination pay plan was governed by
ERISA, and therefore had not set up a claims procedure.., with
respect to that plan."45 The plan in litigation in Bruch was dramat-
ically exceptional in having no written terms regarding claims mat-
ters. By insisting that deference to plan trustees had to rest on the
language of the trust instrument, the Court seized on a criterion that
the plan in Bruch could not satisfy. Other plans, however, can indeed
satisfy that criterion, especially after the Bruch case alerts plan draf-
ters to the need.
C. INVITING EVASION
The Court in Brucb may have thought it was being prudential in
resting its decision on a narrow ground, but in conditioning its re-
quirement of de novo review on the language of the plan document,
the Court may have found a ground so narrow as to be self-defeating.
The Court's emphasis in Bruch on the trust instrument as the basis for
deferential review raises the prospect that an ERISA plan may opt out
of Brucb's de novo review and back into the pre-Bruch world of judicial
deference merely by inserting some boilerplate to that effect in the
plan instrument. Indeed, in a remarkable passage toward the end of
the Bruch opinion, the Court seems to invite plan drafters to trump the
decision by instrument. Bruch's de novo standard of review pertains,
says the Court, "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the terms of the plan."46
Consider, for example, Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualtj Retirement
Plan,47 first decided in the Fifth Circuit four days before the Su-
preme Court released its opinion in Bruch. The question was
45109 S.Ct. at 948.
46109 S.Ct. at 956.
47865 F.2d 692 (5th Cir 1989).
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whether the plan fiduciaries had correctly calculated the employee's
compensation base, on which the plan based its retirement benefits.
The court emphasized the Fifth Circuit's arbitrary-and-capricious
standard and routinely deferred to the plan fiduciaries' calculation.
"Discretion is a touchstone of trusteeship, and we invade the prov-
ince of the trustee only when he violates the proper exercise of his
discretion. 48 The claimant obtained a rehearing in the light of Bruch
but lost anyhow. "The instruments in this case sharply contrast with
the termination pay plan in Bruch. [The plan in this case] grants per-
missive authority to the Plan Committee to 'interpret and construe'
the [plan] and the power 'to determine all questions of eligibility and
status under the [plan]." Similar language appeared in a related plan
instrument. "Unlike in Bruch, there is 'evidence that under' the trust
instruments 'the administrator has the power to construe uncertain
terms [and] that eligibility determinations are to be given defer-
ence."' 49
The post-Brucb law is now replete with such cases, in which the
court decides that a provision in the instrument begets the pre-Bruch
standard. "In actions challenging the denial of benefits under an
ERISA plan which gives the administrator discretion in admin-
istering the plan, review is deferential and is limited to determining
whether the administrator's action is arbitrary and capricious .... o50
1. Construing opt-out terms. The immediate post-Bruch case law has
been troubled by the question of whether particular language in
various pre-Bruch plans is adequate to invoke the opt-out deferential
review that Bruch invites.5 1 This is, however, a transitional phenom-
enon. As drafters amend52 pre-Bruch plans to make deferential re-
view unambiguous, and as pre-Bruch disputes are resolved, this issue
will pass out of contention. The players will learn their lines.
Boilerplate effective to claim deferential review will be all but univer-
sally inserted in plan instruments.
2. Opt-out policy. The puzzle about the Supreme Court's handling
of the Bruch case is now easy to state but impossible to solve. If the
48Id. at 694.
49871 F.2d at 525 (Sth Cir. 1989) (quoting Brucb).
SOMcConnell v. Texaco, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 751 (D. Mass. 1990). See also, e.g., Davis v. Ken-
tucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 1989);Jader v. Principal Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Minn. 1989); O'Dom v. GCIU Supplemental
Retirement & Disability Funds, 722 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
51De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1989).
S2ERISA §402(b)(3) requires that plans be amendable.
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Court was right to think that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
worsened the situation of plan participants and beneficiaries unac-
ceptably, why did the Court permit plan drafters to reinstitute the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard by means of boilerplate grants of
discretion? Indeed, quite a plausible argument can be made that
ERISA's effort to prevent plan drafters from escaping ERISA's
fiduciary norms should prevail in such cases. The statute should be
treated as preventing plan drafters from ousting the ordinarily appli-
cable standard of review. Recall that ERISA section 404(a)(1)(D) con-
tains an anti-opt-out clause, requiring plan instruments to be
"consistent with the provisions of" ERISA.5 3 If the purpose of
ERISA fiduciary law is to protect plan participants from abusive
management by the plan fiduciary, it seems transparently coun-
terproductive to allow the employer to bootstrap around the safe-
guards of the statute by inserting boilerplate in the plans ordering the
courts not to pay much attention to the misbehavior of an employer-
dominated fiduciary.
3. Full circle? Once plan drafters respond to Brucb by modifying
plan instruments to insist on deference to plan fiduciaries, the ques-
tion that Judge Becker confronted in Bruch will recur. Should courts
defer to plan fiduciaries regardless of the circumstances, or should
the courts adjust the scope of deference to take account of factors
such as the degree of disinterestedness of the particular fiduciary?
Remarkably, the Supreme Court in Bruch appears to have anticipated
that issue. Toward the end of its opinion, after priding itself on not
following the Third Circuit in devising a standard of review that is
sensitive to "whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating un-
der a possible or actual conflict of interest," the Court announces:
"Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict
must be weighed as a 'factor[] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion." 54
Thus, the Supreme Court appears to invite the use of a conflict-
sensitive standard of the sort that the Third Circuit tried to devise,
once plan drafters have inserted the necessary boilerplate to claim
deferential review. The Eleventh Circuit accepted this invitation
s"See text at note 15 supra. See also ERISA §410(a), declaring "any provision in [an] instru-
ment which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibil-
ity, obligation, or duty [to] be void as against public policy."
54109 S.Ct. at 956.
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with alacrity, holding in Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama
"that when a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial conflict of
interest on the part of the fiduciary responsible for benefits deter-
minations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its inter-
pretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion was not
tainted by self-interest.
'55
To conclude: The Supreme Court made such a tangle of the trust
law it purported to apply in Bruch that the informed observer will
have difficulty understanding what the Court's purposes really were.
Judge Becker trod a perfectly conventional trust-law56 path to the
Third Circuit's result in Bruch, imposing stricter scrutiny in cases of
fiduciary conflict of interest, impliedly preserving deferential review
for neutral fiduciaries. The Supreme Court's decision to impose de
novo review in all cases extends the requirement of a searching stan-
dard of review to cases in which it hardly seems needed, that is, to
cases in which the fiduciaries are genuinely neutral. But if the Court
wanted to institute such a dramatically protective standard of review,
then the Court's willingness to allow plan drafters to reinstitute the
less searching arbitrary-and-capricious standard by means of a few
pen strokes seems inexplicable.
IV. CONTRACT
Since the Supreme Court was determined to institute de novo
review (with whatever tolerance for evasion) as the notional stan-
dard, the question arises of why the Court did not follow a more con-
ventional doctrinal path to de novo review-contract law. Pension
and employee benefit plans originate in the employment contract.5
7
ERISA requires as a matter of regulatory law that plan assets be
placed in trust, but ERISA does not delimit the boundaries of trust
and contract.
A. DE NOVO REVIEW
De novo review is the norm in contract law for two main reasons.
First, contracting parties are expected to be self-interested. The
55898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (1lth Cir. 1990); accord, Newell v. Prudential Insurance Co., 904
F.2d 644 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
56See text at note 38 supra.
57See discussion in text at notes 18-19 supra.
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premise that underlies deferential review in trust law-namely, that
fiduciaries are disinterested-is absent in contract.5 8 Second, con-
tracts seldom institute a decisionmaker analogous to a trustee. Thus,
in ordinary contract settings, there is neither reason to defer nor any-
one to whom to defer.
In the period before ERISA, standard-of-review questions arising
from pension and employee benefit plans were understood to be con-
tract questions, and the Supreme Court inBruch refers to that tradition
in attempting to justify its reasoning in Bruch. The arbitrary-and-
capricious standard that Firestone urged in Bruch "would require us to
impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to em-
ployees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted." 5 9 Elsewhere in its opinion, the Supreme Court draws upon
contract notions, 60 even while asserting that "[iun determining the
standard of review for actions under [ERISA], we are guided by prin-
ciples of trust law."6 1 Such passages invite the suggestion that the
Court may have thought contract while it talked trust.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's strongest argument for de novo re-
view is drawn directly from contract law. It occurs in a paragraph
immediately following that awkward passage in which the Court
tries to rest its rationale for a trust-law-based de novo standard of re-
view on the insupportable distinction between discretion granted
under the trust instrument and discretion granted under the back-
ground law of trusts. The Court says: "As they do with contractual
provisions, courts construe terms in trust agreements without defer-
ring to either party's interpretation." 62 This argument echoes Judge
Becker's suggestion, mentioned above, that benefit denial cases are
"likely to turn on a question of law or of contract interpretation.
58 By contrast, we have seen that, as applied to the pension or employee benefit trust, the
premise that fiduciaries are disinterested is faulty. Such a trust is not a true donative transfer.
See text at notes 18-22 supra.
59109 S.Ct. at 956.
6°"The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of
employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA. Actions challenging an employer's
denial of benefits before enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If
the plan did not give the employer or administrator discretion or final authority to construe
uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any other contract
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Courts have no reason to defer to private parties to obtain answers to
these kinds of questions. '63 We have questioned whether Judge
Becker's argument overstates the extent to which benefit denial cases
fall on the "law" or "construction" side of the law/fact or construc-
tion/administration line, but the distinction is surely sound at the
margin. When a benefit denial case entails the construction of an in-
strument in circumstances in which there is no application to partic-
ular facts, there would not be much ground for deferring to the
internal decisionmaker either in contract or in trust.
The view that the issue inBruch would be better resolved as a matter
of contract law than as trust law is not an academic afterthought. The
Solicitor General's amicus brief, which the Court in Bruch cites, 64
urged the Court to view the issue as one of contract. The Solicitor
General argued that ERISA's objectives "are best served by resolving
questions of plan interpretation under established principles of con-
tract interpretation." 65 The brief observed that "ERISA's own re-
liance on trust principles is selective, and in no way suggests that
Congress intended that a highly deferential standard be applied
here."'66 The Supreme Court opinion took over from the Solicitor
General's brief (without attribution) the passage arguing that deferen-
tial review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard leaves em-
ployees "worse off than they were before ERISA was enacted. '67
However, the Supreme Court opinion suppresses the Solicitor Gen-
eral's underlying argument-that the comparison to pre-ERISA con-
ditions should incline the Court to a contract-based standard of
review. 6
8
If there is an advantage to treating the issue in Brucb as one of con-
tract law, it is candor. The de novo standard of review that the Su-
preme Court thought appropriate to benefit denial cases follows
automatically as a normal incident of contract law. The Court would
not have had to distort trust law to obtain de novo review. De novo
review was there for the asking in contract. The puzzle about Brucb is
63Text at note 34 supra.
64109 S.Ct. at 954 (column 2, end).
6 5Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 6.
66Ibid.
67Id. at 7. Compare 109 S.Ct. at 956, quoted in text at note 59 supra.
6 8Judge Becker also recommended attention to contract law on the remand that the Third
Circuit ordered in Brucb. "We suggest several principles of contractual construction" for ascer-
taining what the parties intended in the particular circumstances. 828 F.2d at 147.
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not only that the Court insisted on de novo review, but also that the
Court insisted on deriving it from trust law (where it is not the rule)
rather than contract law (where it is).
B. THE PROTECTIVE POLICY
Was there any reason for the Court to have preferred a distorted
version of trust law to a candid version of contract law as the basis for
a de novo standard of review? One possibility is that the Court feared
that the regime of contract law would allow plan drafters too much
latitude for overreaching at the employee's expense. The employer is
economically dominant in many employment relationships. Most
pension and employee benefit plans are unilateral contracts, offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It's a rare employee who has had the
chance to bargain about a pension or health plan, although there is
reason to think that employees sort themselves (in choosing among
employers and in deciding whether to remain with an employer) in
part on the basis of the comparative merits of competing employers'
fringe benefits.
In a prominent pre-Bruch opinion, Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employ-
ees Pension Trust,69 Judge Posner voiced the concern that contract
standards of review might not adequately vindicate the protective
purposes of ERISA. "A Congress committed to the principles of
freedom of contract would not have enacted a statute that interferes
with pension arrangements voluntarily agreed on by employers and
employees. ERISA is paternalistic; and it seems incongruous there-
fore to deny disappointed pension claimants a meaningful degree of
judicial review on the theory that they might be said to have im-
plicitly waived it. 70
Because, however, the de novo standard of review in contract law
is more protective than the deferential standard of trust law as com-
monly understood before Bruch, contract should have been better
suited than trust to vindicate this concern to protect employees from
overreaching. Actually, the serious problem under either contract or
trust is not the implicit waiver to which Judge Posner refers, but ex-
plicit waiver, that is, the use of the plan documents to oust the more
favorable default rule by imposing deferential review. An employer
bent on overreaching may as easily arrange to have the plan docu-
69836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
701d. at 1052.
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ments oust the default regime of de novo review whether that regime
is thought to rest on trust or on contract. Since the Supreme Court in
Bruch invites plan drafters to reinstitute deferential review (albeit
subject to the possibility of stricter scrutiny in conflict of interest
cases), it seems unlikely that the Court was much concerned with
that aspect of the contract standard of review.
If the Court had been worried that a contract-based standard of de
novo review might be too easy for plan drafters to evade, ERISA of-
fered an easy statutory basis for preventing such maneuvers. Section
404(a)(1)(D)-the measure that requires that plan documents be
"consistent with the provisions of" ERISA-could easily have been
read to restrict or to prohibit attempts to oust de novo review, at least
in situations of conflict of interest. Moreover, quite apart from stat-
ute, contract law is not defenseless to such moves when protective
values are offended. Just as trust law exhibits that tradition of strict
scrutiny of a fiduciary's conflict-tainted transactions upon which
Judge Becker relied, so in contract law there are familiar doctrines-
unconscionability, contra proferentum-for responding to over-
reaching. 7'
Thus, the deep issue that lurks in the standard-of-review dispute
when analyzed from the standpoint of contract law is not whether
the particular plan actually claims discretion for the employer, but
rather whether the protective policy of ERISA should allow such a
plan to enforce its claim. ERISA is silent on the precise question.
The Supreme Court in Brucb, we have seen, waffled on the question,
inviting plan drafters to try it, while holding out the possibility that
the resulting conflict of interest might be offensive enough to qualify
"as a 'factor[] [to be weighed] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion."' 72
ERISA abridges freedom of contract in some respects, but not oth-
ers. For example, ERISA's vesting rules73 greatly restrict the parties'
freedom to agree upon forfeiture of accrued pension benefits, yet
ERISA's vesting rules do not apply to nonpension benefits such as
health care. The courts have repulsed efforts to extend the protective
policy of the vesting rules to such benefits. 74 ERISA contains doc-
7 1See, e.g., Farnsworth, Contracts §§4.28, at 495-517 (unconscionability), 7.11, at 265-68
(contra proferentum) (1990 ed.).
72 Text at note 54 supra.
73ERISA §203(a).
74Most prominently, in Hansen v. White Farm Equipment Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.
1986). See generally Langbein & Wolk, note 14 supra, at 421-23.
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trinal pegs, such as the anti-opt-out provision 75 and the exclusive
benefit rule76 that could be used to defeat contractual provisions en-
hancing the discretion of employer-dominated administrators. The
question is whether and in what circumstances the protective policy
of ERISA may be said to justify the use of these doctrines to interfere
with plan terms. How protective, in other words, is ERISA meant to
be? Likewise, the contra proferentum rule, construing the benefit
plan contract strictly against the drafter, could be adopted. 77 But the
price of any of these measures will be lowered levels of plan forma-
tion and less generous funding. From the standpoint of the protected
persons, it seems unlikely that that is the optimal outcome. Here, as
elsewhere in the law, it is all too easy to overprotect. That is why
Judge Becker's focus on actual conflict of interest as the criterion for
strict scrutiny seems to strike such a sensible balance.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bruch garbles long-settled
principles of trust law, confuses trust and contract rubrics, and in-
vites plan drafters to defeat the stated objectives of the decision.
Bruch is such a crude piece of work that one may well question
whether it had the full attention of the Court. I do not believe that
eitherJustice O'Connor or her colleagues who joined this unanimous
opinion78 would have uttered such doctrinal hash if they had been
seriously engaged in the enterprise.
Unfortunately, Bruch is not the first instance in which the Su-
preme Court has discharged ERISA business shoddily. 79 1 under-
stand why a Court wrestling with the grandest issues of public law
may feel that its mission is distant from ERISA. The Court may in-
creasingly view itself as having become a supreme constitutional
7 5ERISA §404(a)(1)(D), discussed in text at notes 15, 71 supra.
76ERISA §404(a)(1)(A), discussed in text at notes 16-17 supra; of comparable import is the
anti-inurement rule of ERISA §403(c)(1).
77A Ninth Circuit panel has started down this path, holding in a recent case against an
ERISA-covered health insurer "that the rule ofcontraproferenturn applies [either] . . . as a mat-
ter of uniform federal law or because federal law incorporates state law on this point." Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990).
78Justice Scalia expressed a reservation about the Court's reasoning in an unrelated question
decided in the same case, see 109 S.Ct. at 958-59.
79E.g., Connolly v. PBGC, 106 S.Ct. 1018 (1986); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); PBGC v. Gray, 467 U.S. 717 (1984); International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
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court, resembling the specialized constitutional courts on the Conti-
nent. If so, the time may have come to recognize a corollary. If the
Court is bored with the detail of supervising complex bodies of statu-
tory law, thought should be given to having that job done by a court
that would take it seriously.
The solution long familiar on the Continent is to have separate
courts of last resort superintend such fields. A supreme court spe-
cializing in ERISA matters, and probably in Social Security and tax
law as well, would treat these subjects with respect, which is more
than can be said for the U.S. Supreme Court in Brucb. Within legal
policy circles in the United States, the caseload problem of the
federal courts has given rise to renewed interest in specialized
courts.8 0 ERISA is an ideal field for experimenting with specialized
courts: It is complex, it is important, and it is relatively well de-
limited from other fields. The evidence from Brucb is that this is a
sphere of subject matter jurisdiction that the Supreme Court would
scarcely miss.
8OSee the symposium on specialized adjudication in 1990 BYU L. Rev. 377-575.
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